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Presidential Influence on Parliamentary Election Timing and the 
Electoral Fate of Prime Ministers 
 
Most presidential heads of state in parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies have 
constitutional powers to influence early election calling. They can therefore affect under which 
conditions prime ministers are held accountable by the electorate. Do these presidents use their 
powers to shape the timing of early elections for partisan advantage and to influence the 
electoral performance of incumbent prime ministers? We examine this question using data 
from 193 elections in eighteen European democracies (1945-2013). Our results indicate that 
presidents use their dissolution powers to shape the frequency of early elections and to 
influence under which conditions elections occur, affecting the electoral success of prime 
ministers. Presidents with significant influence on the dissolution of parliament enable prime 
ministers of governments that include the president's party to realize a significant electoral 
bonus compared to governments that exclude the party of the president.  
 
Do presidents influence the electoral success of prime ministers in parliamentary and semi-
presidential democracies? To date, the literature in comparative politics offers no answer to 
this question. Instead, scholars have examined how the electoral success of incumbents is 
affected by their government's performance. Much of this work shows that voters reward or 
punish prime ministers and governments for the state of the economy and other indicators of 
policy performance (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000; Anderson 2007; Duch and Stevenson 
2008). This emphasis on performance and economic voting ignores the fact that most 
parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies have a presidential head of state who almost 
always has some ability to influence early election calling (Strøm and Swindle 2002; Schleiter 
and Morgan-Jones 2009). Such presidents can shape whether prime ministers face elections 
when conditions are favourable or unfavourable, which may condition whether incumbents are 
rewarded or punished by citizens. Among the eighteen European countries, which we examine 
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in this paper, the overwhelming majority grant the president some influence over the 
dissolution of parliament.2   
Anecdotal evidence suggests that presidential powers to influence the calling of early 
parliamentary elections are politically consequential: In Italy in 1994, President Scalfaro, 
originally a member of the centrist Christian Democratic party who later joined the centre-left 
PPI and then La Margherita, refused a pre-term parliamentary dissolution request by the right-
wing Prime Minister Berlusconi (Grimaldi 2011: 112; Pasquino 2012: 850). As a consequence, 
Berlusconi was forced out of office.  Another well-documented example is the decision of 
Jorge Sampaio, the Portuguese socialist President, to dissolve parliament in 2004. At the time, 
Sampaio was cohabiting with a centre-right coalition led by Prime Minister Pedro Santana 
/RSHV'XULQJWKHFRXUVHRIWKH\HDUWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VHFRQRPLFDXVWHULW\DQGVRFLDOSROLFLHV
became increasingly unpopular and disputes within the governing coalition cast doubt over the 
FDELQHW¶V FRPSHWHQFH DQG VWDELOLW\ :KHQ WKH 6RFLDOLVW 3DUW\ HOHFWHG D QHZ OHDGHU -RVp
Sócrates Carvalho Pinto de Sousa, who proved highly popular with the electorate, President 
Sampaio seized on the government's growing unpopularity and internal divisions to dissolve 
parliament a year ahead of schedule. In the elections that followed, the president's Socialist 
                                                          
2
 This study focuses on European democracies with presidential heads of state. In some of the 
older European democracies, the monarch constitutionally still has a constitutional role in the 
assembly dissolution process. However, monarchs differ from presidents with a role in 
parliamentary dissolution, because they are constrained by the universal norm that the 
dissolution of a popularly elected parliament by the discretionary choice of a hereditary 
monarch is impermissible. This norm applies to all European democracies throughout the 
period under consideration (since 1945). For this reason constitutional monarchies do not form 
part of our sample. 
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3DUW\ VHFXUHG DQ DEVROXWH PDMRULW\ LQ SDUOLDPHQW ZKLOH WKH SULPH PLQLVWHU¶V SDUW\ 36'
sustained heavy electoral losses of 11.4 percent (Magone 2005, 2006). 
In this paper we argue that presidents with the power to influence the calling of early 
parliamentary elections use these prerogatives to further their partisan goals, which has 
consequences for the prime minister's electoral performance. We test this argument with data 
on early elections in eighteen European democracies (1945-2013). Our results indicate that 
presidents with greater dissolution powers increase the incidence of early elections and enable 
their political allies to face the electorate in more favourable contexts than governments that 
they oppose. Consequently, prime ministers who are allied to a president with significant 
influence on parliamentary dissolution realize a sizable vote and seat share bonus when early 
elections are called. Thus, the political relationship between president and government as well 
as the scope of a president's constitutional powers over parliamentary dissolution affect a prime 
minister's electoral success.  
These findings contribute to two literatures of importance in comparative politics. First, 
our study of presidential influence on election outcomes complements and extends the 
literature on presidential activism, which has so far documented how presidents shape 
government composition, formation and termination (Amorim Neto and Strøm 2006; Tavits 
2009; Kang 2009; Schleiter and Morgan-Jones 2009; Schleiter and Morgan-Jones 2010). By 
charting the impact of presidents on the electoral performance of governments, we take this 
literature in a new direction. Second, our results have implications for the literature on electoral 
accountability because they suggest that presidents use their powers to influence early election 
calling in order to promote their own political interests. This opens up new ways of thinking 
about electoral accountability in parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies and charts 
an institutional influence on the accountability relationship between voters and governments, 
which has remained unexplored to date.    
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Electoral accountability, prime ministers and presidential activism  
We draw on three distinct literatures in constructing our argument. The first body of work 
focuses on electoral accountability and asks how far voters hold incumbents to account for 
policy outcomes (Anderson 2007). This literature views electoral choice as shaped by voters' 
observations of the past performance of incumbents, which in turn inform their expectations 
for future performance (Fiorina 1981; Fearon 1999; Duch and Steveson 2008).  Empirically 
these studies have primarily examined accountability for economic outcomes (Fiorina 1981; 
Nannestad and Paldam 1994; Manin 1997; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000; Powell 2000). A 
central finding of this work is that voters are performance oriented: µ[W]hen citizens perceive 
WKHPDFURHFRQRP\DVSUHIRUPLQJSRRUO\WKH\YRWHDJDLQVWWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶5REHUWV
534) and when they see the economy performing well they will reward it.  
Multiple studies suggest that voters focus predominantly on the prime minister and his 
or her party in holding the government to account (Anderson 2000; Hellwig and Samuels 2007; 
Leigh, 2009; Kayser and Peress 2012). Prime ministers have primary political and 
administrative responsibility for the decisions of their governments, and citizens identify prime 
ministers and their parties as the actors who are most responsible for governing and will reward 
or sanction these politicians for their performance. As Duch DQG6WHYHQVRQSXWLWµ(FRQRPLF
YRWLQJ«LVERWKRYHUZKHOPLQJLQFXPEHQF\-oriented (i.e. a poor economy hurts incumbents 
and helps opposition parties) and more important to the party of the chief executive than to 
other incumbents (Dutch and Stevenson 2008: 338).  In examining how presidents affect 
electoral accountability in Europe, we therefore focus on the electoral performance of prime 
ministers.  
Second, our study speaks to work which charts the institutional context that shapes how 
governments are held accountable. One prominent argument is that institutional and 
governmental structures affect the clarity of responsibility, which conditions how well voters 
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are able to attribute responsibility for outcomes and to reward or punish incumbents (Powell 
and Whitten 1993; Anderson 2000; Duch and Stevenson 2008; Hobolt et al. 2013). Thus, 
scholars have suggested that economic and performance voting is stronger when it is easier to 
identify who is responsible for policy.  A second argument originates in the political economy 
literature on opportunistic election timing and proposes that incumbents can shape their 
accountability relationship with the electorate when parliamentary terms are not fixed. These 
studies document that incumbents often call early elections when conditions are favourable and 
governments look their best (Balke 1990; Chowdhury 1993; Ito 1990; Ito and Park 1988; 
Kayser 2005, 2006; Palmer and Whitten 2000; Roy and Alcantara 2012). We draw attention to 
a further feature of the institutional context that can be expected to affect the incumbent's 
electoral performance: Most parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies are republics 
with presidential heads of state who have some degree of constitutional power to influence 
early election calling (Strom and Swindle 2002; Schleiter and Morgan-Jones 2009). The 
influence of these presidents on incumbent performance remains completely unexplored to date 
and we address this lacuna in this paper. 
Third, we build on the literature on presidential activism, which documents many areas 
in which presidential heads of state have proven influential, including government formation, 
cabinet composition and termination (Amorim Neto and Strøm 2006; Tavits 2009; Kang 2009; 
Schleiter and Morgan-Jones 2009; Schleiter and Morgan-Jones 2010; Glasgow et al. 2011). 
Two studies directly investigate the role of the head of state and their power to influence the 
pre-term dissolution of the parliament:  Strøm and Swindle (2002) explore how far heads of 
state shape the frequency of early parliamentary elections. Schleiter and Morgan-Jones (2009) 
examine the effect of presidential powers to call early elections on premature government 
termination. These studies are important because they show that the head of state¶s power to 
call elections is consequential, but they do not investigate the electoral consequences of these 
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powers.  In what follows, we provide the first such study. We explore how presidents use their 
influence on parliamentary dissolution to further their partisan ends and ask how these powers 
impact on the incumbent prime minister's electoral performance.3 
 
Presidents, assembly dissolution powers and incumbent electoral performance  
The literature on presidential activism shows that presidents are political actors whose 
behaviour is shaped by two parameters - their constitutional powers and political motivations 
(Tavits 2009, Shugart and Carey 1992). Constitutional powers determine which formal 
prerogatives presidents can bring to bear in pursuing their aims. Presidents who are endowed 
with constitutional powers to affect the pre-term dissolution of parliament can influence in 
which context such elections are held. Early elections that are called in favourable 
circumstances such as good economic performance can be expected to benefit the prime 
minister electorally because voters are performance oriented and tend to reward incumbents 
when the economy is doing well. But favourable conditions can also arise through other 
circumstances, such as good performance in other policy areas or opposition weakness, which 
can allow even prime ministers whose position is threatened by weak policy performance or a 
fragile parliamentary majority to secure a victory at the polls. In sum, presidents with influence 
                                                          
3
 European constitutions grant both popularly and indirectly elected presidents powers to 
influence parliamentary dissolution and we examine how both types of presidents employ their 
powers. Our study therefore includes parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies. A 
long-running debate focusses on the question whether the behavior of directly elected and 
parliamentary presidents LVFRPSDUDEOH7DYLW¶VZRUNFRQFOXVLYHO\VHWWOHVWKLVGHEDWH
and demonstrates that parliamentary presidents, like their directly elected peers, pursue partisan 
goals by making use of their constitutional powers. 
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on election calling have opportunities to shape the electoral fortunes of the prime minister. 
How presidents employ these constitutional powers is conditioned by their political 
motivations. A president who shares the partisanship of the government can be expected to 
influence parliamentary dissolution to WKH SULPH PLQLVWHU¶V electoral advantage, while 
presidents opposing the government have no political motivation to advantage the prime 
minister. 
Presidents can be expected to employ their powers in order to affect three outcomes: (i) 
the frequency of early elections, (ii) the economic circumstances in which such early elections 
occur and (iii) the performance of the prime minister's party in early elections. Turning first to 
the frequency of early elections, some presidents have full constitutional discretion to dissolve 
parliament, and these heads of state can be expected to have the most extensive impact early 
election calling. Presidents with intermediate levels of dissolution power must typically reach 
agreement with other political actors and therefore have more limited opportunities to achieve 
early elections, while their peers with little or no dissolution power are unable to exercise 
significant discretionary influence on the timing of parliamentary dissolution. If presidents 
make use the opportunities to which their constitutional dissolution powers give rise, then we 
would expect early elections to occur more frequently when presidents have greater dissolution 
powers. This is our first hypothesis: 
 
(Hypothesis 1) Early elections are more frequent when presidents have significant 
election calling powers than when they lack such powers. 
 
Moreover, we anticipate that presidents employ their dissolution powers in a manner 
that is motivated by partisan political considerations. Specifically, presidents with significant 
dissolution powers can be expected to promote the electoral fortunes of prime ministers to 
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whom they are politically allied. This expectation has two observable implications. First, 
presidents with discretionary influence on parliamentary dissolution should enable their 
political allies to access early elections systematically under more favourable conditions (such 
as a strong economy) than governments that they oppose. By timing the elections strategically, 
presidents can ensure that their allies typically face early elections, when they look their best. 
Second, because voters are performance oriented as the literature on economic voting shows, 
the systematic timing of early elections to favourable circumstances can be expected to yield 
an electoral advantage for prime ministers who are allied to presidents with significant 
dissolution powers. Prime ministers whose governments are allied to such presidents should 
therefore outperform their peers electorally.4 These are our second and third hypotheses: 
 
(Hypothesis 2) Governments allied to a president with significant parliamentary 
dissolution power face early elections under systematically more favourable conditions 
than governments that lack such an alliance. 
(Hypothesis 3) Governments allied to a president with significant parliamentary 
dissolution power outperform governments that lack such an alliance electorally in 
early elections.  
 
                                                          
4
 To reiterate, we do not propose that governments become more popular when presidents call 
HDUO\ HOHFWLRQV 2XU DUJXPHQW LV WKDW D SUHVLGHQW¶V LQIOXHQFH RQ HOHFWLRn timing allows 
incumbents allied to the president to benefit electorally because the elections are held under 




Data and variables  
To test our expectations we draw on a dataset that covers 193 elections in European 
parliamentary and semi-presidential democracies with presidential heads of state from 1945 to 
June 2013 (a list of the democracies included in this study is available in the appendix). The 
data are organised as country-year panels.  
Our hypotheses focus on three outcomes: the frequency of early elections, the 
conditions under which early elections occur, and the electoral performance of the prime 
minister. To analyse how presidents influence the frequency of early elections we draw a 
distinction between regular elections, ZKLFK PXVW EH KHOG DW WKH HQG RI SDUOLDPHQW¶V
constitutional term, and early parliamentary elections, which are scheduled prior to the end of 
the constitutionally mandated parliamentary term. Constitutions usually provide a time window 
(often 2 months) for the calling of regular elections, so that these polls do not normally occur 
on the very last day of a parliamentary term. We code an election as regular if it occurs within 
two months of the mandatory end of parliameQW¶VWHUPRULILWLVFDOOHGDIWHUDQHDUO\HOHFWLRQ
LQWKHILQDO\HDURISDUOLDPHQW¶VWHUPGXULQJWKHPRQWKLQZKLFKSDUOLDPHQWDU\HOHFWLRQVDUHE\
convention held. All other elections are coded as early. In order to capture the second outcome 
of interest ± the conditions under which elections are held ± we focus on the state of the 
economy. GDP growth describes the trajectory of the economy. In order to measure growth in 
the crucial months prior to the election, we lag this variable by 6 months relative to the election 
date. To measure the incumbent's electoral performance, we focus on the prime minister's party 
and use two alternative measures, the vote share and the seat share of the party in elections to 
the lower (or sole) house of parliament. 
Our theory focuses on two explanatory variables, presidential dissolution powers and 
WKHSUHVLGHQW¶VSROLWLFDOUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKHJRYHUQPHQW:HPHDVXUHSresidential powers to 
dissolve the parliament by drawing on an index of presidential dissolution power developed by 
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Goplerud and Schleiter (2016).  The index records the constitutional (i.e., de jure) powers of 
presidents to bring about pre-term dissolution of the parliament.5  It is anchored at one end at 
a minimum value of 0, denoting presidents who have no influence on dissolution (i.e., 
Slovenia) and at the other end by a maximum value of 10, which records the complete 
discretion of a president to dissolve the parliament (i.e., Finland 1919).   The index proceeds 
from this maximum value to which it applies penalties for different types of constraints on a 
president's ability to call pre-term elections, including (i) constraints on the president's agenda 
setting role in initiating and advancing the dissolution process, (ii) constraints on the ability to 
decide and trigger dissolution, (iii) time-related constraints on early election calling, for 
example a ban on dissolution for part of the parliamentary or presidential term, (iv) the 
conditionality of a president's ability to initiate, advance or decide dissolution on the binding 
consent or non-binding consultation of one (or more) further actors.  The precise scoring for 
any of these penalties is detailed in Goplerud and Schleiter (2016). The index applies these 
penalties multiplicatively to the maximum score of 10 for each president. When a constitution 
foresees multiple paths to dissolution, Goplerud and Schleiter (2016) focus on the maximum 
score for a president across any of the paths available to them on the assumption that presidents 
will use the dissolution path that they can most easily influence (scores reported in the 
                                                          
5
 We employ a de jure rather than a de facto measure of presidential dissolution powers because 
our objective is to explore how far constitutional prerogatives shape presidential behavior and 
political outcomes. The use of a de facto (i.e. behavioural) measure of presidential power in 
order to account for presidential behaviour would pose problems of circularity and would not 
be appropriate.  
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appendix).6 Finally, we measure the political relationship of the president with the government 
by recording whether the SUHVLGHQW¶VSDUW\LVLQJRYHUQPent (or not). Cases in which either the 
president or the government lack partisan affiliation are coded as cases in which the president¶V
party is not represented in government.  
 
Analysis 
To examine our expectations we employ descriptive analyses and difference-of-means tests. 
The small number of early elections, when further sub-divided by the level of presidential 
GLVVROXWLRQSRZHUVDQGWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VVWDWXVDVSROLWLFDOO\DOOLHGWRWKHSUHVLGHQWRUQRW 
yields analytical groups that are too small to conduct meaningful controlled analyses.7 Our 
conclusions are therefore tentative pending more sophisticated future studies. However, if 
                                                          
6
 As we explain below, the small number of cases in each analytical category does not enable 
us to conduct meaningful controlled analyses. However, a relevant question is whether any 
effect of presidential dissolution powers may be incidental to the correlation between 
presidential dissolution powers and other legislative or government-related powers of a 
SUHVLGHQW7RH[DPLQHWKLVSRVVLELOLW\ZHGUDZRQ6KXJDUWDQG&DUH\¶VDQG0HWFDOI¶V 
(2006) indices of presidential powers. In those democracies that form part of our sample, 
presidential dissolution powers as coded by these two indices have a weak and statistically non-
significant correlation with other presidential powers (Metcalf: -.38, p = .45; Shugart and 
Carey: .42, p = .23). The results that we uncover in this paper are therefore unlikely to be driven 
by any correlation between dissolution powers and other presidential powers. 
7
 A controlled analysis would have to take account of country level, election level and party 
level sources of variation which, given the small number of early elections, gives rise to 
problems of collinearity. 
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presidents behave in the way that we anticipate, the patterns described above should be evident 
in descriptive analyses and difference-of-means tests and should not merely be an artefact of 
model specification in more sophisticated studies. Our paper¶VFRQWULEXWLRQLVWR provide this 
essential evidence.   
(i) The frequency of early elections 
We begin by examining how presidents influence the frequency of early elections. Recall that 
we expect presidents who can influence pre-term parliamentary dissolution to raise the 
incidence of early elections. Table 1 reports the frequency of regular and early elections in our 
sample. For the purposes of the analysis in this paper, we dichotomize presidential dissolution 
powers and distinguish between presidents with significant and weak influence on the calling 
of parliamentary elections. 
 
Table 1: Presidential Dissolution Power and the Frequency of Early Elections 
 
 Frequency 
Strong Presidential Dissolution Powers (>= 5) 
Regular Election 77 
 (55.8) 




Weak Presidential Dissolution Powers (< 5) 
Regular Election 41 
 (74.5) 




Note: Table entries are frequencies, column percentages in parentheses. 
 
 
The upper half of the table focusses on strong presidents with a dissolution powers 
score of at least 5 (the mid-point of the 0 ± 10 scale), the lower half focusses on weak presidents 
whose dissolution power score is smaller than 5. As the frequencies make clear, 44 per cent of 
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all elections under presidents with extensive dissolution powers are called early, compared to 
only 27 per cent under weaker presidents. This 17 per cent difference in the frequency of early 
elections is substantively large and statistically significant (p =  .024), which suggests that 
presidents with discretionary influence on parliamentary dissolution make use of their 
constitutional powers, exactly as hypothesis 1 anticipates. This raises the question whether 
presidents take partisan considerations into account in making their decisions to dissolve. 
 
(ii) The economic conditions under which early elections are called 
Our second hypothesis anticipates that presidents with extensive influence on parliamentary 
dissolution employ their powers to promote the electoral fortunes of prime ministers to whom 
they are allied politically, by permitting them to access to early elections when conditions are 
favourable. Prime ministers whose governments are allied to such presidents should therefore 
face early elections under systematically more favourable conditions than cabinets that lack 
such political ties. Table 2 examines this hypothesis by contrasting the average GDP growth 
levels when early elections are called by a president whose party is (and is not) in government. 
The last two columns of the table report the difference-of-means between these two groups and 
the p-values of difference-of-means tests (based on t-tests).  
 
Table 2: Economic conditions in early elections by partisan relationship to government 
 N Pres Pty 
not in 
Govt 





Strong Presidential Dissolution Powers (>= 5)    
GDP Growth (6 m lagged) 19 1.65 36 2.63 0.98 0.10 
Weak Presidential Dissolution Powers < 5)    
GDP Growth (6 m lagged) 11 1.26 3 2.07 0.80 0.80 




The upper half of the table focusses on presidents with strong dissolution powers (i.e., 
a score of at least 5). The averages make clear that early elections are on average called in a 
very favourable context of strong economic growth, i.e., 2.63 per cent GDP growth, when the 
party of such a president is in government. In contrast, when governments lack an alliance to 
such a president, they face early elections under significantly less favourable conditions (i.e., 
at an average level of GPD growth of 1.65 per cent). This difference is sizable at around 1 per 
cent of GDP growth and statistically significant at the ten per cent level (p = .10).  
The lower half of the table focusses on weak presidents with a dissolution power score 
smaller than 5. Like the upper half of the table, it suggests that governments, which are allied 
to the president tend to face early elections under somewhat more favourable economic 
conditions (i.e., average GDP growth 2.07 per cent) than their peers who experience early 
elections at average GDP growth of just 1.26 per cent. However, the difference of means is not 
systematic and large enough to reach statistical significance (p = .80), given the very small 
number of early elections called by weak presidents. In sum, these results indicate that only 
prime ministers whose governments are allied to presidents with significant dissolution powers 
face early elections under systematically more favourable conditions than their peers, precisely 
as hypothesis 2 anticipates. Recall, moreover, that not just the economy, but also successes in 
other policy areas and opposition weakness give presidents opportunities to time elections to 
circumstances that favour their allies. The advantages that a president with discretionary 
dissolution powers can confer on his or her allies in government are therefore likely to be even 
more formidable than table 2 suggests. 
 
(iii) The electoral performance of prime ministers in early elections 
Our third hypothesis is that DSUHVLGHQW¶VLQIOXHQFHRQtiming early elections to more (or less) 
favourable circumstances has consequences for the electoral performance of the prime 
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minister. Specifically, we anticipate that powerful presidents influence the timing of early 
elections to aid their allies in government. When presidents have significant dissolution 
powers, we therefore expect prime ministers whose governments include the presidential party 
to perform significantly better in early elections than their peers whose governments exclude 
the presidential party. Weaker presidents should not be able to promote the interests of their 
co-partisans in the same way. Table 3 tests that expectation. 
 













Strong Presidential Dissolution Powers (>= 5) 
  
PM Party's Vote Share 25 25.90 36 38.10 12.20 0.00 
PM Party's Seat Share  25 28.92 36 41.91 12.99 0.00 
Weak Presidential Dissolution Powers (< 5) 
    
PM Party's Vote Share 11 26.56 3 35.47 8.90 0.12 
PM Party's Seat Share 11 30.22 3 35.70 5.47 0.38 
Note: PM denotes prime minister. 
 
The upper panel of table 2 focuses on presidents with strong dissolution powers and 
compares the average performance in early elections of prime ministers who lead governments 
that do and do not include the president's party. The last two columns of the table report the 
difference-of-means between these two groups and the p-values of difference-of-means tests 
(based on t-tests). As the panel makes clear, the mean vote share and seat share of prime 
ministers whose governments include the presidential party are 12 to 13 per cent higher than 
those of prime ministers whose governments exclude the president's party.  The difference-of-
means tests indicate that these differences are statistically significant at the one percent level 
or better.  
The lower panel of table 2 focuses on weak presidents. While prime ministers under 
these presidents also appear to fare better in early elections when the president's party is in 
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government, the gap in average performance is smaller (9 per cent for vote shares and 5.5 per 
cent for seat shares), and never reaches conventional levels of statistical significance. Thus 
powerful presidents appear to be able to promote the electoral interests of their allies better 
than presidents with weaker dissolution powers. These results support our third hypothesis that 
presidents with high levels of dissolution power use their prerogatives to influence early 
election calling to the advantage of their partisan allies.  
In sum, our findings offer the first tentative evidence to suggest that presidents use their 
dissolution powers in a partisan fashion. Presidents with significant influence on parliamentary 
dissolution raise the frequency of early elections and influence election timing to enable 
governments that include their co-partisans to take electoral advantage of favourable conditions 
such as a strong economy. Consequently, governments that are allied to presidents with 
extensive dissolution powers perform significantly better in early elections than their peers. 
Our analysis offers suggestive evidence, which will need to be carefully probed in future 
analyses that control for potential confounding variables. While our opportunities to conduct 
multivariate controlled analysis are limited by the small number of cases, our conclusions are 
strengthened by the fact that three different outcomes ± the frequency of early elections, their 
context, and the electoral result for the prime minister ± show evidence of presidential activism 
and influence. 
 
Discussion and conclusion  
Our results provide the first tentative comparative evidence that presidents influence the 
electoral performance of incumbent prime ministers. Two factors, our findings suggest, are 
important in understanding the scope and nature of presidential influence on election outcomes: 
a president's constitutional powers to influence parliamentary dissolution and the president's 
political relationship to the government. 
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Presidents with the ability to influence parliamentary dissolution raise the frequency of 
premature polls and ensure that early elections coincide with circumstances favourable to their 
allies in government. Moreover, prime ministers who are allied to a president with significant 
influence on assembly dissolution achieve a sizable vote and seat share bonus compared to 
their peers who are allied to presidents with weak influence on dissolution or who lack an 
alliance to a president. Jointly, these results provide the first suggestive evidence that 
dissolution powers can be viewed as enabling presidents to have a direct influence on the 
electoral accountability of prime minister in ways that have not previously been identified. 
These findings have potential implications for two areas of importance in comparative 
politics. First, they lay the foundations for a fuller understanding of the political importance of 
presidential dissolution powers in the growing literature on presidential activism. While much 
of this work has focussed on presidential influence in relation to government formation, 
composition and termination, we take a first step in mapping how presidents affect election 
results. 
Second, our findings open up new ways of thinking about the electoral accountability 
of incumbent governments in Europe's parliamentary and semi-presidential republics. In nearly 
all of Europe's republics, presidents have some influence on the timing of early elections. Our 
results suggest that presidential influence shapes under what conditions governments are held 
accountable by voters, which moderates the accountability relationship. This basic institutional 
variation in presidential dissolution powers has remained completely unexplored in the 
literature on performance voting but is likely to be consequential. Given our findings, the role 
of presidents in conditioning the strength of the economic vote may be as important as that of 
clarity of responsibility. In sum, our work has implications for scholars working in a range of 
different fields. 
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Appendix: Countries and Presidential Dissolution Power 
Country Presidential Dissolution Powers 
Austria 10 
Czech Republic (1992) 3.17 
Czech Republic (2009) 3.17 
Estonia 5 
Finland (1919) 10 
Finland (1991) 4.75 
France (1958) 9.03 
Germany 2.50 
Greece (1975) 9.50 
Greece (1986) 2.50 
Hungary (1989) 2.48 






Poland (1989) 5.23 
Poland (1992) 5.23 
Poland (1997) 4.75 
Portugal (1976) 9.50 
Portugal (1982) 8.10 
Romania 2.02 
Slovakia (1992) 2.38 
Slovakia (1999) 3.09 
Slovenia 0 
Notes: The source of the dissolution powers index is Goplerud and Schleiter (2016). 
